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TECHNICAL REPORT ARLCD-TR-78062

DETONATION OF SUANIZINE NITRATE

AND NITROGUANIDINE

MANUFACTURED VIA U/AN AND BAF PROCESSES

J. WENDELL LEACH

**AUGUST 1979** 





US ARMY ARMAMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELJPMENT COMMAND
LARGE CALIBER
WEAPON SYSTEMS LABORATORY
DOVER, NEW JERSEY

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## DETONATION OF GUANIDINE NITRATE AND NITROGUANIDINE MANUFACTURED VIA U/AN AND BAF PROCESSES

J. Wendell Leach

August 1979

\* The attached page 34 (fig. 9) should be substituted for the original page appearing in the technical report identified above.

\*Inserted by, pfcooper, DTIC/DDA-2, 23 Oct.'79

18 September 1979

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE	READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM			
Technical Report ARLCD-TR-78662	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER			
Detonation of Guanidine Nitrate and Nitro-	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED			
guanidine Manufactured via U/AN and BAF Processes	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER			
J. Wendell/Leach	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(a)			
Performing organization name and address  Commander, ARRADCOM  LCWSL  Dover, NJ 07801	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS			
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS  Commander, ARRADCOM  ATTN: DRDAR-TSS	August 1979			
DOVER. NJ 07801 14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(II different from Controlling Office)	47 15. SECUFITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified			
271	184, DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, If different from	45 1 2 1			
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
U/AN - Urea/Ammonium Nitrate Propagation BAF- British Aqueous Fusion Sensitivity Critical diameter Detonation Thermal analysis Nitroguanidine	Welland Process Guanidine nitrate Hazard analysis Propellant Explosive			
The objective was to derive detonation data if the related safety design of facilities for manufathe urea/ammonium nitrate (U/AN) and the British a cesses. Unitial diameter, propagation, sensitivities is of a number of mixtures and compounds, representations in the processes, were determined.	for hazards analysis and for acturing nitroguanidine by aqueous fusion (BAF) proty, and thermal character-			
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### 20. Abstract (continued

Critical diameter tests indicate that streams from the Evaporator Outlet, Mixed Reactor Feed, and the Liquid Reactor Outlet of the U/AN process will propagate when initiated with a booster and that they are mass-detonable. Thermal analysis tests on the stream mixtures indicate that they do not react violently when being heated to elevated temperatures but they do thermally decompose under these conditions.

Propagation test results show that certain streams, peculiar to the U/AN process, propagate when detonated. However, propagation in 5.08 cm (2 in.) pipes was not complete on any mixture containing 25 percent or more water. The results also show that the process streams in the wet guanidine nitrate buildings, used in the BAF process, are not detonable; this is also true of cold melts (molten mixtures allowed to cool) in event of plant shutdown.

The sensitivity (hazard) data on guanidine nitrate shows it is a relatively low-order explosive when compared to TNT, but that it is mass detonable.



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### **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

The author wishes to express his appreciation to the following persons and organizations for their extensive contributions to the detonation study of guanidine nitrate and nitroguanidine.

- 1. Mr. Thomas Caggiano and Mr. George Karshina, Office of the USAMC Project Manager for Production Base Modernization and Expansion.
- 2. Mr. C. H. Nichols, Office of Process Design Technology Branch, Manufacturing Technology Division, ARRADCOM, Dover, NJ.

In addition to providing technical assistance to the Hercules Powder Company in the design and operation of the pilot plant, they also conducted many tests on selected process streams associated with the U/AN (urea/ammonium nitrate) process and the BAF (British Aqueous Fusion) process for guanidine nitrate manufacture and subsequent nitroguanidine production.

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### INTRODUCTION

Improved procedures to produce nitroguanidine by the Urea/Ammonium Nitrate (U/AN) (fig. 1) and the British Aqueous Fusion (BAF) (fig. 2) processes were investigated under MM&T project 5714169 and were summarized in Technical Report 4566 (ref. 1). The current report presents detailed propagation, sensitivity, and dynamic explosive properties of various in-process streams related to the U/AN and BAF processes, in addition to guanidine nitrate and nitroguanidine. This data covers safety considerations related to the hazard analysis of the basic manufacturing processes and also of the BAF based production facility currently being erected at the Sunflower AAP under AMC project 5752632. The basic categories presented in the report cover the areas of critical diameter determination, differential thermal analysis (DTA) and thermal gravemetric analysis (TGA), and propagation and sensitivity determinations.

### PICATINNY ARSENAL TEST STUDIES

A series of tests were performed under MM&T project 5714169 by Picatinny Arsenal in an effort to establish criteria necessary for the manufacture and production of nitroguanidine.

### Critical Diameters

An important phase in the investigation of the U/AN process, figure 3, (ref. 6) was to determine the critical diameters for certain process streams which were suspected of being mass detonable. This data was required to develop design criteria for self-quenching detonation arrestors to reduce the potential loss of personnel and facilities, and to meet safety requirements. The design of an arrestor is normally based upon either an active method which uses a detonation trap, or a passive method based upon critical diameters. The passive method, which is the preferred method if realizable under MMST project 5714169, is the approach used in this study. Critical diameter is defined as the largest diameter of pipe containing the explosive which shows no evidence of propagating an explosive reaction through the test specimen.

Critical diameter determinations were made for four mixtures simulating certain key streams in the U/AN process. The mixtures tested were as follows:

Composition coded #1 U/AN process, evaporator outlet, temperature 130°C:

Guanidine nitrate	13% by wt
Ammonium nitrate	74% by wt
Urea	13% by wt

Composition coded #2 U/AN process, mixed reactor feed, temperature 120°C:

Guanidine nitrate	9%	bу	wt
Ammonium nitrate	60%	hy	wt
Urea	31%	by	wt

Composition coded #3, U/AN process. liquid reactor outlet, temperature 180°C:

Guanidine nitrate	33%	py.	wt
Ammonium nitrate	57%	by	wt
Urea	10%	by	WT

Composition coded #4, nitroguanidine processes, nitroguanidine reactor outlet, temperature 40°C:

Sulfuric acid	56% by wt
Water	7% by wt
Ammonium sulfate	14% by wt
Nitroguanidine	21% by wt
Guanidine nitrate	2% by wt

In testing for critical diameters, assemblies of two or more lengths of different diameter pipes (containing a test composition), joined end-to-end by reducing couplings were used. The length of each section of pipe was selected to assure that propagation would stop within the pipe. Each assembly was initiated with a combination of a C-4 booster in a 3/1:length/diameter ratio and a J-8 blasting cap. In assemblies up to 7.62 cm (3 in.) in diameter, a cylindrical booster 7.62 cm long and 2.54 cm in diameter was used. Assemblies of 10.16 cm (4 in.) in diameter were initiated with a 30.48 cm long by 10.16 cm in diameter conical booster. During some of the initial tests, a rack (fig. 4) was used which contained five pipe assemblies with C-4 boosters and one assembly without a booster.

The assembly without a booster was included to determine if sympathetic detonation would occur. After several initial tests with composition #1, the test rack was discarded because of the difficulty in maintaining and controlling the required test temperature. The rack was cumbersome and required too much time to set up and pour the material resulting in a heat loss. This necessitated reheating in some instances. The results of these tests are shown in table 1. No sympathetic detonation was shown in the firings.

The compositions were conditioned and detonated within  $\pm$  5°C of the specified temperature.

The critical diameter was established in accordance with the procedure specified in the CPIA publication No. 194, procedure 2.18 (ref. 4). Assemblies with progressively increasing diameters were initiated until a detonation was sustained and ceased at some diameter within the assembly. Assemblies with diameters greater and less than this diameter were evaluated until a total of three cessations of propagation at the same diameter were obtained. This diameter was established as the critical diameter. The results of these tests are shown in tables 1 and 2.

Fourteen tests were performed on composition coded #1 at 130°C. The mixture proved to be mass detonable and established a critical diameter of 2.54 cm (1 in.).

Composition coded #2 was tested at 120°C in six different pipe assemblies and a critical diameter of 3.81 cm (1½ in.) was established. The third composition, #3, at a temperature of 180°C indicated a critical diameter of 2.54 cm (1 in.) after a total of eight assemblies were tested. Two assemblies consisting of a 50.8 cm (20 in.) long by 2.54 cm (1 in.) diameter pipe joined to a 30.48 cm (12 in.) long by 1.91 cm (3/4 in.) diameter pipe were tested but did not propagate. Subsequently, two tests were made using assemblies with 45.72 cm (18 in.) long by 3.81 cm (1.5 in.) diameter pipe joined to a 30.48 cm (12 in.) long by 2.54 cm (1 in.) diameter pipe. Propagation occurred through the 3.81 cm (1.5 in.) diameter pipe but not through the 2.54 cm (1 in.) diameter pipe.

The composition coded #4, at 40°C, required more extensive testing to determine if a critical diameter existed for this mixture. The testing started with a 30.48 cm (12 in.) long by 3.81 cm (1.5 in.) diameter pipe and proceeded to a 91.44 cm (37 in.) long by 10.16 cm (4 in.) diameter pipe. In each instance pipe damage was evident but it was assumed to be the result of the C-4 booster and not the composition. To verify this assumption, a test was performed with a 66.04 cm (26 in.) long by 10.16 cm (4 in.) diameter pipe filled with water. The resultant damage was the same as the damage to the pipes tested previously using the mixture; consequently, it was concluded that this mixture is not mass detonable.

### Hazard Testing

A group of samples consisting of aqueous slurries of urea ammonium nitrate and guanidine nitrate were selected for friction and impact testing (ref. 7). Table 3 shows that five of the six samples did not initiate upon impact as per procedure outlined in Picatinny Arsenal Technical Report 3278, page 2. The sixth sample initiated on impact at a drop height of 38 inches which is probably due to the high ammonium nitrate content of the sample.

These samples were also Friction-Pendulum tested in accordance with instructions stated in Picatinny Arsenal Testing Manual #7-1. They showed no reaction with the steel shoe.

### Thermal Analysis

The mixtures described in the critical diameter tests section of this report (table 2) were also subjected to differential thermal analysis (DTA) and thermogravimetric analysis (TGA). The objective of these tests was to determine if reactants and reactant product mixtures, present in the various stages in the production of nitroguanidine, are capable of exploding during a heating cycle. Measurements were made with a DuPont 900 analyze. Figures 5 through 8 contain the thermal data obtained.

The DTA method involves heating the material being analyzed, simultaneously with a thermally inert reference material, to elevated temperatures at a constant rate. The temperature difference between the test sample and the reference is continuously plotted versus temperature. The resultant exothermic and endothermic curves reveal unique characteristics of the material and its physical, chemical, and thermal reactions. The DTA is a continuous record of the thermal effects accompanying melting, boiling, crystalline transition, dehydration, decomposition, oxidation, and reduction and provides a qualitative study of the material.

The TGA method involves continuous weighing of the material under investigation as it is being heated at a constant rate. The weight loss of the test sample is continuously plotted versus temperature. The TGA procedure presents an excellent visual quantitative study of the observed changes.

None of the four mixtures detonated or burned while being subject to either test, as evidenced by the curves. The DTA analysis of the four compositions in the U/AN process is shown in table 4. In no instance during the determinations was there a violent reaction. The mixtures and components appeared to vaporize with some decomposition and reaction. However, the reactions appeared to be controlled.

### Propagation

Tests were performed to determine the explosive propagation characteristics of various streams according to procedure No. 2.18 in reference 4 that may be encountered in both the U/AN and BAF processes. Emphasis was placed upon evaluating the behavior of guanidine nitrate, guanidine nitrate/water, and nitroguanidine/water to determine the minimum water concentration that would sustain detonation. All tests, unless otherwise stated, were conducted in nominal 5.08 cm (2 in.) diameter pipes using a cylindrical C-4 hooster with a length/diameter ratio of 3 to 1 and a J-8 blasting cap. Witness plates of 1.55 cm (3/8 in.) thick mild steel were used to assess propagative behavior. The detonation mate tests were conducted using the test setup shown in figure 9.

### U/AN Process Streams

The compositions and propagation results for the streams representing the guanidine nitrate (GN) crystallizer and the evaporator outlet are in table 5. The crystallizer stream did not propagate in 5.08 cm (2 in.) diameter pipe. The evaporator outlet stream gave complete detonation of 5.08 cm diameter pipe but not in a 2.54 cm (1 in.) diameter pipe.

### BAF Process Streams

The compositions of the process streams of the BAF process and their propagation results are listed in tables 6 and 7, respectively. The tests were conducted over a range of diameters from 2.54 to 15.875 cm (1 to  $6\frac{1}{4}$  in.). In no instance did any of the streams propagate.

### Guanidine Nitrate - Guanidine Nitrate/Water

The detonation rates of technical grade guanidine nitrate are in table 8. Sustained high order detonations occurred during all six tests. The average rate of detonation was 2,762 m/sec. The effect of its dilution with water on the propagation characteristics of guanidine nitrate (table 9) indicates that propagation in 5.08 cm (2 in.) pipes did not occur when water constituted 25% or more of the mixture.

### Nitroguanidine/Water

The propagation characteristics of nitroguanidine/water mixtures are in table 10. The results obtained by diluting nitroguanidine with water are approximately the same as those obtained above for guanidine nitrate. In 5.08 cm pipes, propagation did not occur for water concentrations greater than 30%.

The process streams after dewatering and continuing through drying, for manufacturing both guanidine nitrate and nitroguanidine, contain less water than the critical levels required to sustain propagation. Accordingly, these streams deserve maximum attention with respect to safety design. Additional comments on design parameters are presented in the transition test paragraph and in reference 5.

### CONTRACTOR TEST STUDIES

Extensive sensitivity testing was conducted by the Hercules Powder Company under contract number DACA 45-71-C0121 for the Corps of Engineers (ref. 5) in accordance with CPIA publication No. 194 (ref. 4).

The testing (table 11) included impact, friction, electrostatic discharge, dust explosion, transition, and propagation tests on the reactor mixture charge, nitroguanidine, and guanidine nitrate, both pure and technical grade produced by the BAF process. The data indicates that these materials are relatively insensitive to the stimuli used on them.

### Impact Tests

All impact values were greater than the limits of the impact apparatus, except for the technical grade guanidine nitrate which contained 6 to 7% of ammonium nitrate and which accounts for its increased sensitivity.

### Transition Test (ref. 5)

A transition or critical height-to-explosion test is defined as the height of the material that will react explosively when initiated by flame. Experience has shown that as the diameter of the material increases, the corresponding critical height-to-explosion also increases. The transition test results show that, for all samples tested, the critical height-to-explosion for a 5.08 cm (2 in.) diameter is greater than 60.96 cm (24 in.). Since the reactors and precipitators have height/bed diameter ratio of less than 12, initiation of the materials in these areas of the process by impact, friction,

etc. would result in a fire and not an explosion. A ratio of more than 12 to 1 (height to diameter) would have to exist before an explosion could occur under these conditions.

Propagation Testing (ref. 5)

A propagation test determines the diameter of material that will propagate an explosive reaction when exposed to a shock stimulus. Table 11 shows that the critical diameter for the BAF reaction mixture, guanidine nitrate and nitroguanidine are >7.62 cm (3 in.) <2.54 cm (1 in.) and <1.27 cm (½ in.), respectively. This means that the interconnecting pipelines after the reactors will not propagate an explosive reaction if the diameter is 7.62 cm (3 in.) or less, and that the guanidine nitrate and nitroguanidine dryers will propagate an explosive reaction if subjected to a strong shock source. Yowever, there is no evidence that a shock source exists in the proposed system. As stated in the discussion of the transition tests, any ignition by impact, friction, etc. would result in burning and not an explosion. Therefore, a shock source would have to originate from outside the process, such as from high velocity projectiles, sabotage, etc.

Tables 12 and 13 present a summary of initiation, transition, and propagation test results on simulated compositions found in the mix tanks, dryers, and other operations associated with the U/AN process. The results were similar to those obtained from the BAF materials. These compositions are also relatively insensitive to impact, friction, and electrostatic discharge stimuli. The transition test results also indicate that a maximum height/bed ratio of 12 would result in a fire when subjected to stimuli such as impact, friction, and electrostatic discharge, propagation to explosion would require a strong shock from an external source.

### CONCLUSIONS

- 1. For the U/AN process, the critical diameters determined by using shock initiation were 2.54 cm (1 in.) for the evaporator outlet and the liquid reactor outlet streams, and 3.81 cm ( $1\frac{1}{2}$  in.) for the mixed reactor feed stream.
- 2. The nitroguanidine conversion reactor outlet stream is not mass detonable.
- 3. Thermal analysis tests (DTA and TGA) on the process streams indicated in paragraph 1 above, showed no explosive behavior and produced controlled thermal decomposition only.

- 4. Propagation tests showed that the guanidine nitrate crystallizer stream in the U/AN process did not propagate; and, that the guanidine nitrate evaporator outlet U/AN process stream had a critical diameter of 2.54 cm.
- 5. Welland technical grade (fig. 10) guanidine nitrate yielded a detonation rate of 2,762 m/sec. Mixtures of guanidine nitrate and water did not propagate in 5.08 cm (2 in.) pipes when water was 25% greater in the mixture.
- 6. Mixtures of nitroguanidine and water did not propagate in 5.08 cm (2 in.) pipes when using a water concentration of 30% or greater.
- 7. Impact, friction, and electrostatic sensitivity show that the reactor mixture charge, nitroguanidine, and both pure and technical grade guanidine nitrate are relatively insensitive to these stimuli. Flame-initiated critical height tests indicate that these materials should not transcend to explosion within the process system. An external shock source, e.g., projectiles, sabotage, etc. would be required to stimulate an explosion.

### RECOMMENDATION

If the U/AN process is selected for future facilitation, additional propagation studies should be conducted, on the various process streams associated with it, to gain additional data for more definitive statistical inferences to establish more accurate design characteristics.

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Table 1. Critical diameter tests and results.

<u>Results</u>	DNP - No Sympathetic detonation	Propagation stops at 1"0 2.54cm	Propagation stops at 1%0 junction	DND	Propagation stops at 1%0 junction 3.81cm		No trace of pipe found	No trace of pipe found	Propagation stops at 3/4"% junction	Propagation stops at 3/4" junction	DNP through 1"% pipe 2.54cm	Propagation stops at 1"Ø junction 2.54cm
No of Tests	12	8	2	8	7		7	-	1	H	8	N
Pipe Assembly - Diam & Length	1"\$ x 24", 3/4"\$ x 12"	(2.34cm x olem, i.slem x 30.3cm) 2.0 x l0", l½"0 x l0", l"0 x 8" (5.08cm x 25.4cm, 3.8cm x 25.4cm, 2.5cm x 20.3cm) COMP #1 is l"	2"6 x 10", 1½6 x 10", 1"6 x 8"	1% x 20", 1"% x 12"  (2.05cm x 25.4cm, 5.6cm x 25.4cm, 2.54cm x 20.5cm)  (3.05cm x 20", 1"% x 12"  (3.05cm x 20 cm x 20 cm x 20 cm)	(3.81cm x 30.8cm, 2.34cm x 30.3cm) 2"\$\phi \times 20", 1\chi"\phi \times 12" (5.08cm x 50.8cm, 3.81cm x 30.5cm)	COMP #2 is 1%"	2"\$ x 10", 1\%" x 10", 1"\$ x 4"	(5.08cm x 25.4cm, 3.81cm x 25.4cm, 2.54cm x 10.2cm) 2"\$\psi\$ x 10", 1\psi\$ x 10", 1"\$\psi\$ x 8", 3/4"\$\psi\$ x 6" (5.08cm x 25.4cm, 3.81cm x 25.4cm, 2.54cm x 20.3cm, 1 01cm x 15.2cm)	I. Ø x 10", 3.0", X'Ø x 8" (2.54cm x 25.4cm, 1.9cm x 25.4cm)	1"\$ 10", 3/4"\$ 10", 7"\$ x 8" (2 5/4" x 25 4/4" 10") 10", 25 4/4" 10", 20 8/4"	1"\$ x 20", 34"\$ x 12" (2 strm x 50 8m 1 191 m x 30.5cm)	1%' x 18", 1" x 12" (3.8cm x 45.7cm, 2.54cm x 30.5cm)
Temp. CC	135	135 CRITICAL DIAM OF	130	130	130	CRITICAL DIAM OF	190	190	190	190	190	190
Comp. Nc.	1	1 CRITI	N	0	Ŋ	CRITI	ო	ო	ю	ო	ю	ო

Table 1. (continued)

Results	Pipe blown apart-Probably due to booster	Pipe blown apart-Probably due to booster	DNP	DNP - Pipe blown apart	DNP - 8" pipe remains	DNP - 10" pipe remains 25.4cm	DNP - 10" pipe remains 25.4cm	DNP - 14" pipe remains 35.6cm
No of Tests	н	1	8	7	٦	H	٦	н
Pipe Assembly - Diam ? Length COMP #3 is 1"	1½"Ø × 12"	(3.01cm x 30.5cm) 2"ø x 12" (5.08cm x 30.5cm)	2''Ø x 24'' (5.08cm x 61cm)	4"g x 12" (10.16cm x 30.5cm)	2"Ø x 24" (5.08cm x 61cm)	4'\( \psi \times 36''\) (10.16cm \times 91.4cm)	4"p x 26" (10.16cm x 65cm)	4.p x 36" (10.16cm x 91.4cm)
f•.	40	40	94	40	40	<b>7</b> 0	9 0	9
Comp. No. Temp. <sup>O</sup> C CRITICAL DIAM O	4	4	4	4	4	4 ;	200	ţ

Ø DENOTES DIAMETER - DNP - DOES NOT PROPAGATE

Table 2. (U/AN) GN/NQ process detonation study.

CRITICAL DIAMETED IN	1	1 (2.54 cm)	1½ (3.81 cm)	1 (2.54 cm)	NA
MASS	DETONABLE	YES	YES	YES	ON
·	TEMP C	130	120	180	04
	COMPOSITION	13% GN 74% AN 13% U	9% GN 60% AN 31% U	33% GN 57% AN 10% U	56% H.SO, 7% WATER 21% NQ 2% GN 14% AS
	STREAM	EVAPORATOR OUTLET	MIXED REACTOR FEED	LIQUID REACTOR OUTLET	NQ REACTOR OUTLET
	PROCESS	U/AN	U/AN	U/AN	U/AN AND BAF

Table 3. Hazard testing results.

Friction Pendulum Steel Shoe	No reaction	No reaction	No reaction	No reaction	No reaction	No reaction		
Charge weight,	0.015	0.017	0.033	0.026	0.032		0.031 (73°F)	0.029 (74°F)
PA App 2 Kg. wt., in.	40+	40+	40+	40+	38		40+	40+
Wt. %	5.0	14.3	30.0	8.8	9.0	32.0	haken	ecanted
Mt. %	0.0	0.0	5.0	7.7	14.9	6.0	Sample No. A Shaken	Sample No. B Decanted
Mt. %	1.0	0.7	30.0	34.3	66.7	28.0	Sample	Sample
Wt. %	94.0	85.0	35.0	9.2	17.8	34.0		
Temp.	158 <sup>0</sup> F 70°C	Ambient, 76°F	212°F 100°C	Ambient, 76°F	275°F 135°C	Ambient, 76°F		
Location in Pilot Plant	Centrifuge drier	Centrifuge	Querch Product	Evaporator Inlet	Evaporator Outlet	Crystallizer Outlet		
Sample No.	-	2	<b>:</b>	4	w	9		

Table 4. DTA tests on stream compositions.

	Sa	mple Contents(%)	Observed Endotherms (°C)	Observed Exotherms	Remarks
ī.	Evap Feed Outlet	UREA (13%) NH <sub>4</sub> NO <sub>3</sub> (/4%) Guanidine Nitrate (13%)	60°, 95° 120°, 135° 160°, 270° 300°	None	Sample vaporized away Smoothly beginning at 160°
11.	Mixed Reactor Feed	UREA (31%) NH4N03 (60%) Guanidine Nitrate (9%)	60°, 72°, 90° 95°, 130° 260°, 300°	None	Extensive vapor- ization begins at 160° and is complete at 315°C.
III.	Liquid Reactor Outlet	UREA (10%) NH4NO3 (57%) Guanidine Nitrate (33%)	60° 110° 260° 300°	330°	Frothing observed at 280°C. No violent reac- tion observed.
IV.	NQ De- hydration Reactor Outlet	Sulfuric Acid (56%) Water (7%) Ammonium Sulfate(14%) Nitroguanidine (Class II lot NCW 3-16 (21%) Guanidine Nitrate (2%)		150° 175° 320°	Smoke and vapori- zation. No violent reaction after cooling residue was solid.

Table 5. U/AN process stream composition.

	GN Crystallizer Diameter	GN EV	aporator Outl Diameter	<u>et</u>
Operation	2 Inch	2 Inch	2 Inch	1 Inch
Ingredients %				
Guanidine Nitrate (GN)	34.0	17.8	18.5	18.5
Ammonium Nitrate	28.0	66.7	66.6	66.6
Urea	6.0	14.9	14.9	14.9
Water	32.0	0.6		
Temp.			250 <sup>0</sup> F	250 <sup>0</sup> F
	DNP*	Complete Detona- tion	Sustained Propaga- tion	DNP*

\*DNP - Did not propagate

Table 6. Composition of BAF process streams.

Stream Identification	Stream	Composit	ion, Wt	<u>%</u>	
Operation					
Number	4	14	94	100	116
Ingredients					
Calcium Nitrate	18.6	25.8	0.25		0.40
Guanidine Nitrate	16.7	20.5	13.9	13.3	7.91
Ammonium Nitrate	<b>46.</b> 2	39.0	46.53	44.6	74.96
Water	12.3	11.4	39.24	42.1	16.73
#4R-202Primary ReactorTemp	250°F (121°	oc)			

#14-R-205-Fourth Stage Reactor--Temp  $250^{\circ}F$  ( $121^{\circ}C$ )

#94-L 236 A & B--Crystallizers-Temp  $70^{\circ}F$  (21 $^{\circ}C$ )

#100--Stream--Temp 70°F (21°C)

#116--E-234--Evaporator--Temp 338°F (170°C)

Table 7. Propagation characteristics of BAF process streams.

Stream_Number		Nominal	Diame	ter,	Inches	
	1	2	3	4	5	64
4		N				
14	N	N	N			
94			N			
100		N				
116			N			
BAF Reactor Cold Melt				N	N	N

N - Did not propagate or incomplete propagation.

Table 8. Detonation velocity of technical grade guanidine nitrate - witness plate data.

Pipe Size 1" (2.54 cm)

No.	Alum (62 mls)	Approx. Diam. of Depression inches	Guanidine Nitrate(GMS)	Approx. Depth of Depression inches	Time Over lft in Msec (1 x 10-6)	Rate m/sec	Re	sults
1	No	1.125 2.86 cm	140	.195 .50 cm	111.2	2,741		Order Frag
2	No	1.125 2.86 cm	146	.175 .44 cm	109.2	2,791	**	"
3	No	1.063 2.70 cm	148	.165 .42 cm	108.6	2,807	11	
4	Yes	1.000 2.54 cm	145	.130 .33 cm	109.7	2,778	"	11
5	Yes	0.750 1.91 cm	146	.100 .25 cm	111.6	2,731	"	ti
6	Yes	1.000 2.54 cm	142	.120 .30 cm	112.0	2,721	**	11

2,762 m/s Avg.

Table 9. Propagation characteristics of guanidine nitrate/water mixtures.

Mixture	Composition, Wt %	P			st Results er, in.
<u>GN</u>	<u> </u>	1.0	11/2	_2_	21/2
100	0	Y	Y	Y	Y
95	5	N*			
85	15	N	Y*		
80	20			Y	
75	25			N	
<b>7</b> 0	30			N	
60	40			N	

<sup>\*</sup>N - Did not propagate or incomplete propagation

Y - Detonated completely

Table 10. Propagation characteristics of  $NQ/H_2O$  mixtures.

Mixture Composi	tion, Wt %		n Test Results	
NQ	<u>н</u> 20	$\frac{1.27}{2}$ $\frac{3.8}{1!}$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	7.62 cm $\frac{3}{1}$ in.
80	20	*Y		Y
70	30	N	N	Y
60	40		N	
40	60		N	

\*N - No Incomplete

Y - Yes

Table 11. Test results for NG plant (BAF process).

Propagation	1" - NP (2.54cm) 2" - NP	(5.1cm) 3" - NP (7.6cm)		CF <1/2" (SCH 40 Confinement)	;	(1"=2980 m/sec (2.54cm)	(2½"-3780 m/sec) (6.4cm)
Transition	> 24" @ 1" ID (61cm @ 2.54cm) > 24" @ 2" ID	(61cm @ 5.1cm)		> 24" e 2" ID (61cm e 5.1cm) (SCH 40 Con- finement)	i	>24" @ 1" ID (61cm @ 2.54cm) >24" @ 2" ID (61cm @ 2.54cm)	ng /sec (2.54cm) /sec (5.1cm)
Dust Explosion			≥4.1 oz/ft (4.1 kg/m³)	≥4.1 <sub>3</sub> oz/ft (4.1 kg/m <sup>3</sup> )		≥4.1 <sub>3</sub> oz/ft (4.1 kg/m <sup>3</sup> )	ide x 24" (61cm) Long NQ 1" booster - 2560 m/sec (2.54cm) 2" booster - 2785 m/sec (5.1cm)
ESD	5.0 Joules ambient			0.5 Joules	1.26 Joules	0.075 Joules	(30.5cm) Wide > NQ
Friction	<b>2</b> 65,625 psi @ 8 ft/sec	(452 MPa @ 2.4 m/s)		≥104,761 psi ⊕ 8 ft/sec (722 MPa ⊕ 2.4 m/s)	= 122,400 psi	2.105,800 psi @ 8 ft/sec (729 MPa @ 2.4 m/s)	>122,800 psi e 10 ft/sec (847 MPa e 3.0 m/s) 2cm) Deep x. 12"
Impact	<b>2</b> 211,500 ft-lb/sec	(287 kj/s)		≥ 77.6 <sub>2</sub> ft-lb/ in (175 kj/m <sup>2</sup> )	≥ 59.7 <sub>2</sub> ft-lb/ in (135 kj/m <sup>2</sup> )	31.6 <sub>2</sub> ft-lb/ in (71 kj/m <sup>2</sup> )	>122,800 psi e 10 ft/sec (847 MPa e 3.0 m/s) 3.0 m/s)  1.0 booster - no propagation (2.54cm) 2.1 booster - propagation 2900 m/sec (5.1cm) 2.1 booster - 2785 m/s
Temperat:"e	125°C		Ambient	Ambi ent	Ambient	Ambient	<u>nyer Configuration Propagation Tests</u> <u>3N</u> 1" booster - no propagation (2.54cm) 2" booster - propagation 2900 m/s
Sample	Ca(NO <sub>3</sub> ) <sub>2</sub> 26.6%	NH NO 40.2% GN 21.2%	H <sub>2</sub> 0 12% CaCN <sub>2</sub>	Ŏ.	GN-Pure	GN-Technical Grade	Dryer Configuration Prope GN 1" booster - no propagat 2" booster - propagation

Table 12. Summary of initiation test results.

ESD*				0.5		1.26	0.075	
Friction (@ 8 fps)		>69,000 psi (476 MPa)	≥69,000 psi (476 MPa)	≥67,000 psi (462 MPa)	39,090 psi (269 MPa)	≥122,400 psi (844 MPa)	>105,800 psi (729 MPa) >122,800 psi <u>2</u> / (844 MPa)	45,614 psi (314.5 MPa)
Impact (ft-lbs/in)				$\geq 59.7$ (135 $\text{Kj/m}^2$ )	84 x 10 <sup>3±/</sup> (114 Kj/sec)	≥59.7 (135 Kj/m <sup>2</sup> )	31.6 (71 Kj/m <sup>2</sup> )	≥77.6 (175 Kj/m²)
Temperature		Ambient	Ambient	Ambient	135°C	Ambient	Ambient	ე <b>,09</b>
Simulated Mix		Mix Tank	Mix Tank	Mix Tank	Mix Tank	Dryer	Dryer	Eutectic Tank
xture	GN	1	ı	1	•	Pure	Technical Grade	4.0
Sample Mixture	n	н	П	r <del>i</del>	н			1.5
0.1	AN	H	7	. <b>4</b>	4			4.5

Rate term since sample under test was in a liquid phase. (ft-lbs/sec)

<sup>(2)</sup> At 10 fps.

<sup>\*</sup> ESD - Electrostatic Discharge

Table 13. Transition and propagation results.

Remarks	Smoke, mutile noise sample scattered	Smoke, muffle noise sample scattered	No reaction, sample left in pipe	Sample consumed	Propagation	Propagation	Started, then stopped 13" to 17" pipe left (33cm) (43cm)	No propagation 17" to 20" pipe left (43cm) (51cm)
Velocity (m/sec)	ì	ı	1	2980 3780	ı	ı	1200-1300	ı
Critical Ht. or Critical Diam. (in.)	H = 24 (61cm)	≥24 (61cm)	≥24 (61cm)	<1 (2.5cm)	<pre>&lt;1 (2.5cm)</pre>	<1 (2.5cm)	1 (2.5cm)	>1 (2.5cm)
Container Size (2) (in.)	1 x 24 (2.54cm x 61cm)	2 x 24 (5.1cm x 61cm)	2 x 24 (5.1cm x 61cm)	1 x 24 (2.54cm x 61cm) 2½ x 24 (6.4cm x 61cm)	1 x 24 (2.54cm x 61cm)	1 x 24 (2.54cm x 61cm)	1 x 24 (2.54cm x 51cm)	1 x 24 (2.54cm x 61cm)
Temperature	Ambient	=	180°C	Ambient	180°C	2°081	100°C	၁ <sub>၀</sub> 09
Test Sensing	Visual	E	=	Probe	<b>.</b>	r	=	=
Simulated	Dryer	ŧ	Reactor Tube after 2 hrs of heating	Dryer	Reactor Tube after 2 hrs of heating	Reactor Tube	Mix Tenk	Eutectic Tank
Initiation Source	12 gm bag igniter	÷	Pyrofuze (Al- Pd-alloy	Comp C-4 <sup>(1)</sup>	:	=	=	=
Semp1e	Technical Grade GN	Technical Grade GN	AN/U/Silica Gel 4/1/l	Technical Grade GN	AN/U/Silica Gel 4/1/1	GN/AN	9.4/4.0 AN/U 4/1	GN/AN/U 3.4/3.8/2.8

(1) Comp C-4 size - Diameter equal to pipe diameter and length 3 x diam. (2) Pipe - Schedule 40, closed bottom for both tests, top capped for transition and top plate for propagation.

# NITROGUANIDINE PROCESS REACTIONS UREA/AMMONIUM NITRATE TECHNOLOGY

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2 NH <sub>2</sub> -C-NH <sub>2</sub>	•	NH4NO3	SILICA BEADS (NH2)2 -C=NH·HNO3 + NH4 CO2 NH2
UNEA	AMMONI	MONIUM NITRATE	GUANIDINE NITRATE AMMONIUM CARBAMATE
NH4CO2 NH2	ATE		DECOMPOSITION 2NH3 + CO2 AMMONIA CARBON DIOXIDE
(NH <sub>2</sub> ) <sub>2</sub> —C=NH·HNO <sub>3</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> SO <sub>4</sub> - GUANIOINE NITRATE SULFURIC A	·HNO3	+ H <sub>2</sub> SO <sub>4</sub>	DEHYDRATION (NH2)2 CNHNO2 ·HSO4 + H2 O MITROGUANIDINE BISULFATE WATER
(NH2) CNHNO2 ·HSO4-	2.HSO	14 TE	DISSOCIATION NH2 C(NH)NH-NO2 + H2 SO4 WATER NITROGUANIDINE SULFURIC ACID

Figure 1. U/AN process reaction sheet.

NEUTRALIZATION (NH4)2 SO4
AMMONIUM SULFATE

NEUTRALIZATION (NH4) SO4

NH4 HSO4

AMMONIA

+ H2 SO4 ---

AMMONIA

## CHEMISTRY OF NITRAGUANIDINE SYNTHESIS BAF PROCESS

•	+ 2NH <sub>3</sub>				+ H <sub>2</sub> 0 (85-90% ACID)	
-	+ NH2-C-NH2-HN03 + 2NH3  E GUANDHE HITTATE OR GH AMENIA	3 18047E	+ 2NH4NO3 100 NTE AMERICAN	+ 602 44 CARBON PHOKEDE		NQ PRECIPITATE + 25% H <sub>2</sub> SO <sub>4</sub>
\$	03 ———	0 [NH4]2CO3	13 — CAEGJ3   100 ONATE CALCIUM CARRONATE	CALCHE OXDE	H2SO4 NH2-C-N NM	H20 NQ PRE
•	CALCHUA CYANAMDE AMMONIM MTEATE	+ C02 + H20	Ca[NO <sub>3</sub> ] <sub>2</sub> + [NH <sub>4</sub> ] <sub>2</sub> CO <sub>3</sub> ta ** Calcium mitate amone areguate	CaCO3 100 CALCIUM CARBOWATE	NH2-C-NH2-HN03 122 GUANDINE MITATE OR CH	NQ DISSOLVED
CALCIUM CYANAMIDE MANUFACTURE CACOM CARDE GUANIDINE NITRATE MANUFACTURE	נאונו	AMMONIA RECOVERY  2NH3  2NH3  AMMONIA	CALCIUM REMOVAL	CO2 RECOVERY	NO MANUFACTURE	NO RECOVERY

OTE: NUMBERS BELOW COMPOUNDS ARE MOLECULAR WEIGHTS

Figure 2. BAF process reaction sheet.





Figure 3. Guanidine nitrate pilot plant process f

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


Figure 4. Critical diameter test apparatus.




Figure 5. DTA and TGA - Sample I.





Figure 6. DTA and TGA - Sample II.






Figure 8. DTA - Sample IV.

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


Figure 9. Propagation rate defonation apparatus.

## NITROGUANIDINE

## REACTIONS OF WELLAND PROCESS

Figure 10. Welland process reaction sheet.

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